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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
—000O000—

HARRY MILLER,
Petitioner and Appellant,
Appeal No. 20080921-CA
vs.
STATE OF UTAH,
Defendant and Appellee.

:
—000O000—

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(f).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Rule 12(b)(6) U.R.C.P. allows dismissals only when Plaintiff has failed to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff has met the basic requirements
of the statue governing these actions, Utah Code Ann., § 78B-9-402. Plaintiff has
asserted that he was factually innocent, based upon evidence that he was not in the
State of Utah at the time the crime was committed. He has also shown that some of

the evidence in that regard was obtained after the original trial, and could not have
been discovered through due diligence prior to trial. Plaintiffs allegations are
sufficient to avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), and the dismissal should be
reversed.
Pursuant to Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 364 (Utah 1995), the
standard or review in this matter is that the factual allegations are accepted as true,
and all reasonable inferences are drawn from them in a light most favorable to
Plaintiff. The propriety of such a dismissal is a question of law, and is reviewed for
correctness, giving no particular deference to the trial court.

T h i s i s s u e was

preserved for appeal by Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs Opposition
to that Motions (R 64-65; 70-134;135-158).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES AT
ISSUE
The relevant portions of the Utah Code and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are
included in an Addendum hereto including:
Utah Code Ann., § 78B-9-401, et seq., the Postconviction Determination of Factual
Innocence.
Rule 12(b)(6) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
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Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the Order and Judgment of the Third District Court, Salt
Lake City Department, Salt Lake County, granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
for failure to state a cause of action, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) U.R.C.P. This is an
action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78B-9-402 seeking compensation for
imprisonment, due to actual innocence. Plaintiff was previously convicted of
aggravated robbery, pursuant to Utah code Ann. § 76-3-302, a first degree felony.
That conviction was reversed; and all charges were dismissed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
References herein are to the Record of this Case, No. 080907781 (R.), and to the
Record of the previous criminal case, No. 031901163FS (R2.)
Petitioner was arrested on February 11, 2003; and was charged in the Third
District Court with the crime of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, on or about
February 18, 2003, in Case No. 031901163FS. (R2. 1-6). He was remanded to the
custody of the Salt Lake County Sheriff on that date. The Information alleged that the
crime was committed in Salt Lake County on or about December 8, 2000. (R2. 3).
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Petitioner was tried by jury on the felony charge of aggravated robbery on
December 16, 2003 (R2. 35-36). At trial, Defendant claimed an alibi defense, but
was the only witness to that fact. He testified that he had previously lived in Utah;
but lived in Donaldsonville, LA at the time of the crime, and had been living there
since 1999. He testified that he had had a stroke in late November, 2000, and had
to take some time off work. (R2 162-163). The parties entered into a written
stipulation, to be read at trial, that Mr. Miller had been admitted to the River West
Medical Center in Louisiana on November 25,2000 for a "cerebrovascular accident"
(a stroke). He was employed by Ten M Corp in Donaldsonville, LA. from May 2000
until February, 2002, and had taken medical leave from November 25 until December
13, 2000. (R2. 40). He also testified that he returned to Utah, where he had lived
from 1989 to 1999, in February, 2002.
Petitioner was convicted; and on February 9,2004, he was sentenced to a term
in the Utah State Prison of from five years to life (R2 135-139). Mr. Miller was
incarcerated at the Utah State Prison, or the Salt Lake County jail, from February
2004 until his release on July 6, 2007, when the Court dismissed all charges against
him, on the Motion of the Salt Lake District Attorney.
Petitioner appealed his conviction to this Court under Case No. 20040150(R2.
4

156). On February 7, 2005, his appellate counsel filed a Motion to Remand the
matter to the District Court to enter findings concerning Petitioner's claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. His appellate counsel argued that other alibi
witnesses could have, and should have, been obtained, including Defendant's niece,
Berthella Miller, who would testify that Defendant was living with her and
Defendant's sister, after the stroke, and that she saw him daily during this period of
time. (R2. 160-168). Berthella filed an affidavit with the Court to this effect. (R2.
211-212). Also, Beverly Kolder, a registered nurse who provided home care to
Defendant, filed an affidavit with the Court in support of the Motion. That affidavit
stated that she visited Mr. Miller in Donaldsonville on December 7, 2000 and again
on December 14,2000. An assessment produced by the nurse on December 14,2000,
included the statement: "Able to ride in a car only when driven by another person OR
able to use a bus or handicap van only when assisted or accompanied by another
person." (R2 172-186). Neither had been contacted by Defendant's trial attorney.
Defendant's sister, Paula Miller, was contacted by Defense counsel prior to the
trial, but she was unwilling to come to trial, because of other family problems in
Louisiana. She filed an affidavit with the Court that Mr. Miller had lived with her
after he was released from the hospital on November 28, 2000, and had returned to
5

work on December 13, 2000. She stated that he did not leave the State during that
time, and that she believed he would not have been physically able to travel long
distances. (R2.234-236). There were also Court records from Louisiana indicating
that Defendant had appeared in Court in Ascension Parish Court, State of Louisiana
on December 5, 2000 for fishing without a license. (R2. 208).
The victim, on the other hand, was sure that Defendant was the one who robbed
her, despite the fact that it had been over two years since the robbery, when she
identified him from a photo line up and an in-person lineup. (R2. 158 p. 65-66; 94).
She had, however, seen black men she thought might be the robber a few other times,
but had never been sure (R2. 158 P. 68). Her identification was supported by the
store clerk at the Stop n' Go outside of which the robbery had occurred, who stated
that he had seen the Defendant around the store aevery now and then" prior to the
date of the robbery, and specifically stated that he was able to identify Defendant
because of his prior contacts with him. (R2. 158 p. 96-97). The sightings, "several
times", were between July and December, 2000 as he had only started working there
in July. (R2. 158 p. 98-99).
See also the narrative report by Sgt. Charles Oliver, of an interview with the
store clerk who provided the second identification of Mr. Miller, from a photo lineup
6

shown him on October 24, 2003, almost three years after the incident. While the
clerk picked Mr. Miller out of the photo spread, the report also states: "Mr. Nissan
states that he knew the black male as a customer who came into the store once in a
while. He states he did not know his name but just recognized him as a customer."(R.
151). See also the e-mail exchange between Gretchen Havner and Kent Morgan,
Assistant Justice Division Director and a man known for his determination to convict
criminals, only a week or so before the State moved to dismiss the charges:
Kent Morgan: I am reviewing the file . . . thus far, I see this as only a single
eyewitness identification case with no corroboration. . .if I find no
corroborative evidence .. .1 think I will be letting this case go .. .1 have some
concern that a third person identified your client as a former customer.
(Emphasis added).
Gretchen Havner: The reason I believe the store clerk is mistaken about
Harry's identity is we can show Harry was employed by 10M Corporation in
Donaldsonville, Louisiana, from the end of May 2000 until February 2002.
Therefore, he wouldn't have been in Salt Lake City to be a regular customer
at the store leading up to the date of the incident. (R. 156).
On or about April 26, 2005, the Court ordered the matter remanded to the
District Court for additional factual findings regarding the claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, pursuant to Rule 23B of the Rules of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. The order stated that it was for the purpose of allowing the
"Third District Court to conduct hearings and take evidence as necessary to enter
7

findings of fact necessary to determine the following claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel".
On February 1, 2006, the matter was returned to the Court of Appeals, after
additional facts were determined. No finding was made of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
The appeal was scheduled for oral arguments before this Court on January 22,
2007. On or about January 18, 2007, the parties filed a Stipulated Motion for
Summary Reversal; and on the day set for oral arguments, this Court dismissed the
appeal and remanded the case to this Court for a new trial.
A retrial was scheduled for July 12, 2007. On July 5, 2007, the Salt Lake
District Attorney notified the District Court that it would not be going forward to trial
on the assigned date, and filed a Motion to Dismiss. On July 6, 2007, the trial Court
signed the Order dismissing all charges, "in the interest of justice". Defendant
dismissed was released from custody the same day.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Petitioner's Petitioner, brought under the recent legislation providing for
compensation to those unjustly convicted and imprisoned, alleges sufficient facts to
defeat Defendant's Motion, under Rule 12(b)(6) U.R.C.P. to dismiss, based on the
8

failure to State a cause of action. The allegations, if true, show that Defendant is
highly unlikely to have committed the crime with which he was charged, and of
which he was previously convicted.
Further, the trial Court erred in its standard of review. First, it should have
reviewed the Petition in light of the reversal of the conviction, ad the dismissal of the
criminal charges. Second, it should not have relied on the factors set out in Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-9-402 (2)(a), as those requirements do not apply to petitions
brought under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-402 (b). The search here should be for
justice, not for a slavish adherence to form.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
ASSUMING THE ALLEGATIONS TO BE TRUE, PETITIONER HAS ALLEGED
ADEQUATE FACTS TO REQUIRE THE COURT TO HOLD AN EVIDENTIARY
HEARING ON THE QUESTION OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE.
This is a Petition to determine factual innocence, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78B-9-401. This Petition is brought pursuant to Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. This Petition was filed within one year of the date that retrial was
scheduled, and upon which this Court ordered all charges dismissed. Further, this
Petition was filed promptly upon jurisdiction being conferred on the District Court
9

to determine factual innocence, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-401 et seq.,
effective May 5, 2008. In its 2008 general session, the Utah legislature passed Utah
Code Ann., previously designated as §78-35a-401, et seq. and now recodified as §
78B-9-401 et seq., entitled "Postconviction Determination of Factual Innocence".
The act provides for the filing of a Petition, similar to that provided for by the PostConviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-101, et seq., and subject to the
provisions of Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as to form and content.
A Petition is to be filed in the District Court having jurisdiction over the matter, and
shall request a hearing to determine factual innocence. The Petitioner may allege
"newly discovered evidence that establishes that the petitioner is factually innocent."
It should be sufficient, in conjunction with other evidence, to establish factual
innocence. Petitioner claims that there is substantial new evidence which defense
counsel did not produce at trial.

In the alternative, Petitioner asserts that the

evidence taken as a whole shows factual innocence, and no other finding is necessary.
Therefore, Petitioner alleges that this matter should have been set for hearing to
determine factual innocence.
The trial Court granted Respondent's Motion to Dismiss this action pursuant
to Rules 12(b)(6) and 65Cofthe Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b)(6) allows
10

a Motion to Dismiss based on the failure to State a cause of action. According to the
Utah Supreme Court, in Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 1995):
"A rule 12(b)(6) Motion to dismiss admits the facts alleged in the complaint
but challenges the Plaintiffs right to relief based on those facts." In
determining whether a trial Court properly granted a Motion to dismiss under
rule 12(b)(6), we accept the factual allegations as true and consider them and
all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them in a light most favorable to the
Plaintiff. (Internal citations omitted) (Emphasis added).
At this point, Petitioner does not need to prove factual innocence. He only needs to
show that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on that allegation. The State, on the
other hand, in order to sustain the dismissal, must show that, even if all the
allegations are true, there is no reason to have such a hearing, as the allegations are
insufficient in themselves. The burden of proof at the evidentiary hearing is not now
important. Certainly, the strong evidence of alibi defense, the poor quality of the eye
witness identification, and the nonsensical conclusions relied upon to show guilt are
sufficient to get past Rule 12(b)(6) U.R.C.P.
Petitioner's appellate attorney, in the closing paragraph of his Reply Brief to
this Court, on direct appeal, summed up the original conviction:
Here, the result was so unreliable as to approach the absurd. To propose that
a man who lived and was gainfully employed in a small Louisiana town would
- after being disabled by a stroke - somehow travel over 1800 miles without
any of his caretakers knowing about it, immediately commit a random crime
li

against a stranger with negligible gain, and get himself home without anyone
noticing his absence defies logic.
Petitioner has always maintained that he was in the State of Louisiana on the
day when the crime was committed, and so testified at trial. Prior to the remand,
additional testimony as to an alibi defense was obtained, which had not been available
at the original trial. Petitioner claims factual innocence by virtue of his alibi defense,
and the high degree of certainty that he was not present at the time and place the
offense was committed. Mr. Miller would have had to fly to Utah on December 7th,
almost immediately after his nursing appointment, commit the crime, and return to
Louisiana shortly thereafter. The nurse's comments show that he was not in physical
shape to do so. No evidence has been produced whatsoever that such a trip was
made. While some suggestion has been made that he came out to see his brother, his
brother gave a statement to the police indicating that he had seen the Defendant for
some time. His caretakers did not notice his absence; and given the tight timeline,
such a visit makes little sense.
The previous remand to the District Court was not to determine innocence, but
instead to determine whether trial counsel met the minimum standard necessary to
fulfill his legal duty to defend the Defendant in court. This Court's remand order ,
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however, also included the instruction: "If trial counsel's performance is found to be
deficient, the prejudicial effect, if any, of the deficient performance on the outcome
of the trial." (R2. 253). In addressing that issue, the trial Court did review certain
newly discovered facts that had not been introduced as evidence at trial. The most
important items of evidence were the the testimony of Berthella Miller, Defendant's
niece; and the affidavits of Beverly Kolder, a home health care nurse assigned to
assist Mr. Miller while he recuperated from a stroke suffered in late November.
There were also affidavits submitted by Melissa Landry, the interim director of River
West Home Care, as to the dates of care provided by the agency, and Defendant's
sister, Paula Miller.
Berthella Miller testified personally that she had seen him every day during
the three weeks he was out of work due to his illness. The Court found that there were
many factors involved in counsel's inability to obtain all the witnesses and
information needed to present the alibi defense. He had incomplete information about
the home health care agency. He was able to contact Defendant's sister, Paula, but
he was unable to convince her, because of other family problems, to come to Utah to
testify. He was not told of Berthella, the niece, and did not get in touch with her. He
reasonably believed that the alibi case was strong , based on the stipulation and the
13

testimony of Mr. Miller. (R2. 596-609). The Court made the following findings
about the witnesses who had not been called by defense counsel at trial:
53.

Berthella made inconsistent statements and had a poor memory of
defendant's stroke. The Court therefore finds that her testimony was, at
best, not reliable and that she would not have been a credible witness at
Defendant's trial.

58.

Evidence from the home health care nurse concerning the dates of her
visits to defendant would have narrowed the window of time that
defendant could have been gone from Louisiana, but would not have
provided an alibi for the date of the crime on December 8, 2000

59.

Evidence from the home health care nurse fails to establish a reasonable
probability of a different outcome at trial.

60.

Because of her inconsistent statements and lack of memory about crucial
information, testimony from Berthella Miller at the evidentiary hearing
was not credible. If her testimony had been presented at trial, it would
have been weighed against all of the other facts, testimony, and evidence
presented at trial, including the credible testimony of the victim and the
second eye-witness.

61.

Testimony from Berthella Miller fails to establish a reasonable
probability of a different outcome at trial. (R2. 606-607).

The affidavit of Ms. Kolder firmly placed Mr. Miller in Donaldsonville, Louisiana the
day before the robbery, the visit having concluded at 11:02 AM on that day. The
Court responded that "Defendant could have traveled by airplane from Louisiana to
Utah on December 7, 2005 [should be 2000]". (R2. 600).

14

While that is true, of

course, it should be rather obvious that the scenario is highly unlikely. Mr. Miller
does not travel by plane.

Even though members of the UACDL and others

contributed to a fund to help him get back to Louisiana after he was released, he
never considered a plane, but instead took the bus. The State's brief, filed in the
Court of Appeals, referred to the period of time that Mr. Miller was out of work from
November 28 through December 13 to recuperate from the stroke, and suggested that
"this time gap allowed Defendant time to travel to Salt Lake City to visit his brother,
commit the robbery, and return to Louisiana." (P. 8)(Emphasis added). The logistics
of getting to Salt Lake City in time to commit this crime make it nearly impossible.
If Mr. Miller had driven, it would have taken over 27 hours, something not possible
to do in time, even assuming he could physically have made such a trip. If he had
flown, he would have to have driven to New Orleans, a trip of about one and a half
hours, gotten on a plane, paid extra to fly direct, and POSSIBLY made it in eight
hours. For what purpose, to rob somebody of a few dollars and then fly back in time
to go back to work, and for his next home nursing visit? Nobody has ever attempted
to plot out what planes he would have taken, and whether the planes actually did
arrive on time.
The trial Court found that trial counsel there was not deficient regarding the
15

home health care nurse, "because defendant failed to provide him with information
to locate this witness, and because evidence from this witness does not establish an
alibi for the date of the crime." Regarding the testimony of Petitioner's niece, there
was no deficiency "because counsel was unaware that Berthella had any relevant
information, defendant failed to tell him that Berthella might have been a helpful
witness, and defendant failed to provide him with information to locate this witness."
The Court went on to state that, even assuming that the two witnesses had testified,
"there is no reasonable probability of a different result" at trial, due most importantly
to "the credibility of the two eye witnesses who testified at trial." (R2. 608-609).
In making its previous findings, the Court made its own determination of the
credibility of the witnesses and potential witnesses. The Court, in particular,
discounted the testimony of Bethella Miller, as her memory was not sharp, and details
were lacking. This is not surprising, in light of the fact that the incident at issue was
then over five years old. The State, in its Motion below, also points out that
Petitioner's evidence "must be weighed against the State's two credible eyewitnesses
who have repeatedly identified petitioner as the robber." (R. 77). The Court appears
to have relied upon its previous findings, in its ruling here granting the Motion to
Dismiss. So, both the Court and the State were in error, in relying on assertions of
16

credibility. For purposes of a Motion under Rule 12(b)(6). Credibility is not at issue;
nor is the relative weight of the "State's two credible eyewitnesses". See again
Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 1995): "In determining whether
a trial Court properly granted a Motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6), we accept the
factual allegations as true and consider them and all reasonable inferences to be
drawn from them in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff."
In referring to those "credible" witnesses, the State seems to be taking the
position that their testimony has some strong weight, because it was sufficient to
convict, before that conviction was overturned. When reviewed in conjunction with
later discovered evidence, that evidence, given some three years after the robbery, is
NOT all that credible. By the time the date set for retrial approached, it appears that
the corroborating testimony of Mr. Nissen had been totally discredited. The case was
weakened to the point that the charges were dropped. It is disingenuous at this point
to make the claim that the State's case is so strong that no hearing on innocence
should even be held.
POINT II
THE LAW SHOULD BE READ TO GIVE EVERY CHANCE TO AN INNOCENT
PERSON TO BE COMPENSATED FOR UNJUSTIFIED IMPRISONMENT.

17

Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure applies to "Postconviction
relief" It was promulgated before the Postconviction Determination of Innocence
Act was passed, and does not contemplate its use here. However, the Rule does
prescribe the procedure for a Petition, which states the grounds for relief and the
allegations that need to be made. The Rule is designed for someone who is
attempting to remove a conviction which is still on the record. It does not speak to
the situation where there is no conviction. Nevertheless, the procedures of the Rule
have been followed, including the Petition, the attachments and the supporting
memorandum. The rule allows for summary dismissal of the Petition, if the Petition
is frivolous on its face, or if it does not support a claim for relief, as a matter of law.
In this regard, it tracks Rule 12(b)(6) U.R.C.P., but does not add to it. This Petition
is not frivolous; and it does not fail to State a cause of action as a matter of law. The
allegations are sufficient, if believed, to show that the Petitioner is factually innocent.
Thus, the petition is sufficient under the rule.
This is the very first case brought under the new law. This new law, which
allows for compensation to someone who has been imprisoned for something he did
not do, is in the same chapter of the code as the Post Conviction Remedies Act. It
reflects some of the same policy considerations, and contains some of the same
18

limitations. But there is a fundamental difference in the proceedings, which the State
and the trial Court did not acknowledge. The Post Conviction Remedies Act will
only be used by someone who has been finally convicted of a crime and is seeking
relief from that conviction. Because that person has already had a constitutional right
to an appeal (Constitution of Utah, Art. VIII, § 5) the right to bring post-conviction
proceedings is limited to situations where the appeal did not vindicate the right of the
criminal Defendant to due process of law. Such a case would not be brought if the
appeal were successful. Therefore, the requirements include that there be new
evidence which could not, with reasonable diligence have been discovered in time to
be included in post trial motions, and the appellate process. An exception is made
when counsel for Defendant in the underlying criminal proceedings was found to be
ineffective. While there was a claim made on Petitioner's direct appeal that trial
counsel was ineffective, and while that claim was not upheld, the appeal was
successful. Counsel for the State downplays that fact in saying:
Although both parties agreed that there was "an error in the trial proceedings"
and petitioner's conviction was accordingly reversed, the nature of the error is
not stated and therefore this unspecified error cannot be the basis for ordering
a hearing for factual innocence. (R.78-79). (Emphasis added).
It once again approaches the absurd to read this statute not to favor compensation
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where the conviction has been reversed on appeal, and the case has been dismissed.
We now know that Mr. Miller was incarcerated for something of which he is
presumed innocent. The law should not be read to prevent his compensation under
these circumstances.
The State opened its memorandum below with a recitation of the requirements
of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-402(2)(a). Those include that there is new evidence, that
the evidence is not merely cumulative of what was known at the time of trial, and that
the evidence shows that Defendant is factually innocent. Part of the statute referred
to by the State reads:
(vi)(A) neither the petitioner nor the petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence
at the time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any
previously filed post-trial Motion or post conviction motion, and the evidence
could not have been discovered by the petitioner or the petitioner's counsel
through the exercise of reasonable diligence.
However, the new law (Utah Code Ann § 78B-9-402(2)(a)(vi)(A))allows the Court
to waive the necessity of either showing that the evidence could not have been known
at trial, or that counsel was ineffective, in the interest of justice. On the face of it, a
person who has had his conviction reversed seems to have no advantage over the
person who filed this Petition from his prison cell; but that does not make sense. The
act mimics the "Post-Conviction Remedies Act", in requiring, in § 78B-9-402((2)(a)
20

that "the petitioner identifies the specific evidence the petitioner claims establishes
innocence". But, see Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-402(2)((b):
A person who has already obtained postconviction relief that vacated or
reversed the person's conviction may also file a petition under this part if no
retrial or appeal regarding this offense is pending. (Emphasis added).
Petitioner contends that this language does, in fact, grant some advantage to the
person who no longer has a conviction. He may "also file a petition"; but he is not
specifically restrained by the language of § 78B-9-402((2)(a). This is a separate and
distinct part of the statute, which can stand on its own without any reference to
subparagraph (a). Why should the Petitioner here be required to show that the
information regarding innocence was unknown to him or his counsel at the original
trial, if the results of that trial did not stand? If he had gone to retrial, could he not
have introduced all available evidence of his innocence, regardless of when and how
it was discovered? What interest does the State now have in defending the result of
the original trial, which has now been discredited? The purpose of this statute is to
compensate the person who has been unjustly punished for something it now appears
he did not do. Further, the statute, in requiring proof of actual innocence, prevents
compensation to someone who has prevailed because evidence of his guilt has been
suppressed as wrongfully seized. But this is not such a case. Here, after trial, the
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evidence of innocence continued to build until the State agreed to a summary reversal
of the guilty verdict, not based on a "technicality", but because it no longer appeared
that the evidence, taken as a whole, could support the verdict. Then, the State took
the additional step of moving to dismiss the charges and release the Defendant from
jail,"in the interest ofjustice". And all of this occurred after the trial Judge had found
the evidence insufficient to support the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The same trial Judge rejected the cumulative evidence of innocence in the context of
this Petition, based on her previous decision, which, the parties have stipulated,
stopped short of doing justice. The trial Judge reviewed this Petition using the
wrong standard.

The petition, having been filed after the momentous events

involving the dismissal, deserved and required a truly de novo review. What it
received was an improper deference to a previously discredited ruling: "the Court
reviewed this evidence as part of a remand from the court of appeals and determined
that there was 4no reasonable probability of a different result even if [the new
witnesses] had testified.'" (R. 172).
Petitioner contends that the State and the trial Court erred in their contention
that this statute should be limited in its relief to the trial which resulted in the
conviction. In the end, the State refused to take this case to retrial, based on newly
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discovered weaknesses in the evidence, These facts do not now stand as having been
proved. The conviction was reversed, based on the serious questions raised by newly
discovered facts. The "credibility of the two eye witnesses who testified at trial" was
seriously questioned by both sides in this litigation. Contrary to the State's assertions
here, there is now a very strong presumption of innocence. The State very rarely
concedes that a trial reached such an unfair result that it must be summarily reversed.
The State now contends that nothing can be read into that stipulation. This was a
very serious move, and a great deal must be read into it. The trial Court erred
seriously in assuming that the case was in a similar posture on this petition to where
it was on the remand from this Court. At that time, the trial Court looked at the case
with the knowledge of a conviction, and determined whether there were obvious
mistakes which were serious enough to set aside the conviction. On this Petition, the
Court should have looked at the case with the knowledge that it had been wrong the
first time. There were, in fact, errors serious enough to justify reversal. The State
should get no comfort or support in the claim that no one can know what those errors
were. We have seen them; and they have justified reversal. The State now asks this
Court to affirm the trial Court's error in failing to understand the completely new
posture of this case.. It still may be true that Defendant could conceivably have
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gotten on an airplane, come out to Utah, and robbed a stranger for a few dollars,
nowhere near enough to pay for the airplane ticket; but at this point, everyone must
concede that this does not make sense.
The ruling of the trial Court, by the Judge who presided over the trial, and also
reviewed the record for evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel, is harsh and
illogical in its conclusions:
First, it is apparent from the record that Petitioner cannot meet either
subsection (vi)(A) or (vi)(B). Specifically, Petitioner was aware of the
substance of this evidence at the time of trial and it was all presented to his
appellate counsel for purposes of making ineffective assistance of counsel
claims on appeal Additionally, the Court found that trial counsel was not
ineffective. Although the Court could waive either or both of these
requirements in the interest of justice, the Court finds that Petitioner has not
met other prongs of 78B-9-402. (Emphasis in original).
Petitioner has not shown that the evidence, upon which he seeks to rely, is not
cumulative of evidence presented at trial. Petitioner presented his alibi defense
at trial. These additional witnesses would have served only to bolster his
testimony, not to present a wholly new assertion. (R. 172).
As pointed out above, Petitioner should not have to comply with those subsections,
as those only apply to someone who still has a conviction. The Court notes that she
reviewed the new evidence upon remand from the Court of Appeals, and found
counsel not to have been ineffective; and she ends the inquiry there. She reviewed
the evidence and made the decision that a reasonable jury would likely have
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convicted anyway, even if they had known of the new evidence that was now before
her. She applied the "harmless error" rule, that an error committed which would not
likely have changed the outcome, does not justify a reversal. See State v. Adams,
2000 UT 42, 5 P.3d 642 (Ut 2000). But she ignored the fact, that these facts clearly
did justify a reversal.
Under the circumstances, the State was simply wrong in its assertion below
that "should a hearing be granted, the burden of proof as to petitioner's factual
innocence does not lie with the State." (R. 77). The State must indeed bear some
burden to overcome the presumption of innocence. The State, lamely pointed out that
"this Court has already found that petitioner 'could have traveled by airplane from
Louisiana in December 7, 2005 [again, should be 2000]." (Emphasis added). In
another place in its memorandum, the State made the point with even less force: "it
still remains possible for petitioner to have committed the crime". (Emphasis added)
(R. 76). The State then made this giant leap of faith: "The State respectfully submits
that no bona fide issue exists in this case as to whether the petitioner is factually
innocent". The State did not even try to prove the case against Defendant, after its
original case had unraveled. Therefore, there really is "no bona fide issue" as to
Petitioner's innocence.
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Near the end of its memorandum: "The State maintains that there is no
compelling interest of justice that requires that a factual innocence hearing now be
granted to petitioner in this case." (R. 78). That statement conveys total indifference
as to whether an innocent man has been unjustly punished, and punished severely.
The Court of Appeals, in State v. Todd. 2007 UT App 349, 173 P.3d 170 (Utah App.
2007) explained the role of the prosecuting attorney in criminal cases:
In our judicial system, "the prosecution's responsibility is that of a "minister
of justice and not simply that of an advocate", which includes a duty "to see
that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon
the basis of sufficient evidence.5" f 17. (Internal citations omitted).
The State's position is that a petitioner, who was imprisoned for over four years for
a crime that has been dismissed for lack of evidence, does not have a claim which
arises to the level of the "compelling interest of justice". The State's attorneys are
abdicating their responsibility as "ministers ofjustice". The United States Supreme
Court recently expanded the requirement that counsel be furnished to a criminal
Defendant at the very beginning of the criminal proceeding, in order to avoid a
miscarriage of justice. In the case of Rothgery v. Gillespie County. Case No. 07-440
(June 23, 2008), the Court reinstated a civil lawsuit for denial of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, in a case involving an erroneous arrest. Defendant there
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was arrested and jailed for a period of time as a felon in possession of a firearm.
Counsel was not immediately appointed to represent him. When counsel was
appointed, it was determined that the arrest was as a result of a faulty computer entry
regarding the former felony. Clearly the Supreme Court, seeing that this innocent
man was jailed without a fair chance to show his innocence, found this to be a case
of a "compelling interest of justice".
In light of all this, the conclusion of the trial Court is nothing less than chilling
in its failure to recognize the importance of the underlying search for justice:
Finally Petitioner cannot show that this evidence would "establish" that he was
innocent. Although the evidence makes it unlikely that Petitioner committed
the crime, the Court reviewed this evidence as part of a remand from the court
of appeals and determined that there was "no reasonable probability of a
different outcome at trial if [the new witnesses] had testified." (Emphasis
added). (R. 172).
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-405 provides that, upon a finding of factual
innocence, the Petitioner shall be paid a sum equal to "the monetary equivalent of the
average annual nonagricultural payroll wage in Utah, as determined by the data most
recently published by the Department of Workforce Services at the time of the
petitioner's release from prison" for the time he spent incarcerated in this matter.
Petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing without a preconceived determination.
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Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to compensation, and requests that this amount be
determined, after the finding of factual innocence.
CONCLUSION
This case is before this Court on review of the dismissal of Petioner's Petition
under Rule 12(b)(6) U.R.C.P., which allows a dismissal for failure to State a cause
of action upon which relief may be granted. Petitioners' Petition does, in fact allege
sufficient facts to require an evidentiary hearing on innocence, and to defeat such a
Motion. The dismissal should be reversed, and the matter should be remanded to the
District Court for an evidentiary hearing.
DATED t h i s ^ l l day of January, 2009.
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH, LX.C.

M

W. Andrew McCullough
Attorney for Appellant
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Addendum

30

78B-9-401. Title.
This part is known as "Postconviction Determination of Factual Innocence."

78B-9-402. Petition for determination of factual innocence — Sufficient allegations
— Notification of victim.
As used in this part:
(1) "Factually innocent" means a person did not:
(a) engage in the conduct for which the person was convicted;
(b) engage in conduct relating to any lesser included offenses; or
(c) commit any other felony arising out of or reasonably connected to the facts
supporting the indictment or information upon which the person was convicted.
(2) (a) A person who has been convicted of a felony offense may petition the district
court in the county in which the person was convicted for a hearing to establish that the person is
factually innocent of the crime or crimes of which the person was convicted, if the person asserts
factual innocence under oath and the petition alleges:
(i) newly discovered material evidence exists that establishes that the petitioner is
factually innocent;
(ii) the petitioner identifies the specific evidence the petitioner claims establishes
innocence;
(iii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was known;
(iv) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence;
(v) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered evidence demonstrates that
the petitioner is factually innocent; and
(vi) (A) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the time of
trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previously filed post-trial motion or
postconviction motion, and the evidence could not have been discovered by the petitioner or the
petitioner's counsel through the exercise of reasonable diligence;
(B) a court has found ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to exercise reasonable
diligence in uncovering the evidence; or
(C) the court waives the requirements of Subsection (2)(a)(vi)(A) or (2)(a)(vi)(B) in the
interest of justice.
(b) A person who has already obtained postconviction relief that vacated or reversed the
person's conviction may also file a petition under this part if no retrial or appeal regarding this
offense is pending.
(3) If some or all of the evidence alleged to be exonerating is biological evidence subject
to DNA testing, the petitioner shall seek DNA testing pursuant to Section 78B-9-301.
(4) The petition shall be in compliance with Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
and shall include the underlying criminal case number.
(5) After a petition is filed under this section, prosecutors, law enforcement officers, and
crime laboratory personnel shall cooperate in preserving evidence and in determining the
sufficiency of the chain of custody of the evidence which is the subject of the petition.
(6) (a) A person who files a petition under this section shall serve notice of the petition
and a copy of the petition upon the office of the prosecutor who obtained the conviction and upon
the Utah attorney general. The attorney general shall, within 30 days after receipt of service of
the notice, or within any additional period of time the court allows, answer or otherwise respond
to all proceedings initiated under this part.
(b) (i) After the time for response by the attorney general under Subsection (6)(a) has
passed, the court shall order a hearing if it finds there is a bona fide issue as to whether the

petitioner is factually innocent of the charges of which the petitioner was convicted.
(ii) If the parties stipulate that the evidence establishes that the petitioner is factually
innocent, the court may find the petitioner is factually innocent without holding a hearing.
(7) The court may not grant a petition for a hearing under this part during the period in
which criminal proceedings in the matter are pending before any trial or appellate court, unless
stipulated to by the parties.
(8) Any victim of a crime that is the subject of a petition under this part, and who has
elected to receive notice under Section 77-38-3, shall be notified by the state's attorney of any
hearing regarding the petition.

78B-9-403. Requests for appointment of counsel — Appeals — Postconviction
petitions.
(1) Subsections 78B-9-109(1) and (2), regarding the appointment of pro bono counsel,
apply to any request for the appointment of counsel under this part.
(2) Subsection 78B-9-109(3), regarding effectiveness of counsel, applies to subsequent
postconviction petitions and to appeals under this part.

78B-9-404. Hearing upon petition — Procedures — Court determination of factual
innocence.
(1) (a) In any hearing conducted under this part, the Utah attorney general shall represent
the state.
(b) The burden is upon the petitioner to establish the petitioner's factual innocence by
clear and convincing evidence.
(2) The court may consider:
(a) evidence that was suppressed or would be suppressed at a criminal trial; and
(b) hearsay evidence, and may consider that the evidence is hearsay in evaluating its
weight and credibility.
(3) In making its determination the court shall consider, in addition to the evidence
presented at the hearing under this part, all the evidence presented at the original trial and at any
postconviction proceedings in the case.
(4) If the court, after considering all the evidence, determines by clear and convincing
evidence that the petitioner:
(a) is factually innocent of one or more offenses of which the petitioner was convicted,
the court shall order that those convictions:
(i) be vacated with prejudice; and
(ii) be expunged from the petitioner's record; or
(b) did not commit one or more offenses of which the petitioner was convicted, but the
court does not find by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner did not commit any lesser
included offenses relating to those offenses, the court shall modify the original conviction and
sentence of the petitioner as appropriate for the lesser included offense, whether or not the lesser
included offense was originally submitted to the trier of fact.
(5) (a) If the court, after considering all the evidence, does not determine by clear and
convincing evidence that the petitioner is factually innocent of the offense or offenses the
petitioner is challenging and does not find that Subsection (4)(b) applies, the court shall deny the
petition regarding the offense or offenses.
(b) If the court finds that the petition was brought in bad faith, it shall enter the finding
on the record, and the petitioner may not file a second or successive petition under this section
without first applying to and obtaining permission from the court which denied the prior petition.

78B-9-405. Judgment and assistance payment.
(1) (a) If a court finds a petitioner factually innocent under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Part 3,
Postconviction DNA Testing, or under this part, and if the petitioner has served a period of
incarceration, the court shall order that, as provided in Subsection (2), the petitioner shall receive
for each year or portion of a year the petitioner was incarcerated, up to a maximum of 15 years,
the monetary equivalent of the average annual nonagricultural payroll wage in Utah, as
determined by the data most recently published by the Department of Workforce Services at the
time of the petitioner's release from prison.
(b) As used in this Subsection (1), "petitioner" means a United States citizen or an
individual who was otherwise lawfully present in this country at the time of the incident that gave
rise to the underlying conviction.
(2) Payments pursuant to this section shall be made as follows:
(a) The Office of Crime Victim Reparations shall pay from the Crime Victim
Reparations Fund to the petitioner within 45 days of the court order under Subsection (1) an
initial sum equal to either 20% of the total financial assistance payment as determined under
Subsection (1) or an amount equal to two years of incarceration, whichever is greater, but not to
exceed the total amount owed.
(b) The Legislature shall appropriate as nonlapsing funds from the General Fund, and no
later than the next general session following the issuance of the court order under Subsection (1):
(i) to the Crime Victim Reparations Fund, the amount that was paid out of the fund under
Subsection (2)(a); and
(ii) to the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice, as a separate line item, the
amount ordered by the court for payments under Subsection (1), minus the amount reimbursed to
the Crime Victim Reparations Fund under Subsection (2)(b)(i).
(c) Payments to the petitioner under this section, other than the payment under
Subsection (2)(a), shall be made by the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice quarterly
on or before the last day of the month next succeeding each calendar quarterly period.
(d) Payments under Subsection (2)(c) shall:
(i) commence no later than one year after the effective date of the appropriation for the
payments;
(ii) be made to the petitioner for the balance of the amount ordered by the court after the
initial payment under Subsection (2)(a); and
(iii) be allocated so that the entire amount due to the petitioner under this section has
been paid no later than ten years after the effective date of the appropriation made under
Subsection (2)(b).
(3) (a) Payments pursuant to this section shall be reduced to the extent that the period of
incarceration for which the petitioner seeks payment was attributable to a separate and lawful
conviction.
(b) (i) Payments pursuant to this section shall be tolled upon the commencement of any
period of incarceration due to the petitioner's subsequent conviction of a felony and shall resume
upon the conclusion of that period of incarceration.
(ii) As used in this section, "felony" means a criminal offense classified as a felony under
Title 76, Chapter 3, Punishments, or conduct that would constitute a felony if committed in Utah.
(c) The reduction of payments pursuant to Subsection (3)(a) or the tolling of payments
pursuant to Subsection (3)(b) shall be determined by the same court that finds a petitioner to be

factually innocent under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Part 3, Postconviction DNA Testing, or this part.
(4) (a) A person is ineligible for any payments under this part if the person was already
serving a prison sentence in another jurisdiction at the time of the conviction of the crime for
which that person has been found factually innocent pursuant to Title 78B, Chapter 9, Part 3,
Postconviction DNA Testing, or this part, and that person is to be returned to that other
jurisdiction upon release for further incarceration on the prior conviction.
(b) Ineligibility for any payments pursuant to this Subsection (4) shall be determined by
the same court that finds a person to be factually innocent under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Part 3,
Postconviction DNA Testing, or this part.
(5) Payments pursuant to this section:
(a) are not subject to any Utah state taxes; and
(b) may not be offset by any expenses incurred by the state or any political subdivision of
the state, including expenses incurred to secure the petitioner's custody, or to feed, clothe, or
provide medical services for the petitioner.
(6) If a court finds a petitioner to be factually innocent under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Part
3, Postconviction DNA Testing, or this part, the court shall also:
(a) issue an order of expungement of the petitioner's criminal record for all acts in the
charging document upon which the payment under this part is based; and
(b) provide a letter to the petitioner explaining that the petitioner's conviction has been
vacated on the grounds of factual innocence and indicating that the petitioner did not commit the
crime or crimes for which the petitioner was convicted and was later found to be factually
innocent under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Part 3, Postconviction DNA Testing, or this part.
(7) A petitioner found to be factually innocent under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Part 3,
Postconviction DNA Testing, or this part shall have access to the same services and programs
available to Utah citizens generally as though the conviction for which the petitioner was found
to be factually innocent had never occurred.
(8) Payments pursuant to this part constitute a full and conclusive resolution of the
petitioner's claims on the specific issue of factual innocence.

Rule 12. Defenses and objections.
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, a
defendant shall serve an answer within twenty days after the service of the
summons and complaint is complete within the state and within thirty days after
service of the summons and complaint is complete outside the state. A party
served with a pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve an answer thereto within
twenty days after the service. The plaintiff shall serve a reply to a counterclaim in
the answer within twenty days after service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered
by the court, within twenty days after service of the order, unless the order
otherwise directs. The service of a motion under this rule alters these periods of
time as follows, unless a different time is fixed by order of the court, but a motion
directed to fewer than all of the claims in a pleading does not affect the time for
responding to the remaining claims:
(a)(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on
the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after notice of
the court's action;
(a)(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive
pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of the more definite
statement.
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be
asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the
following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3)
improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of
process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to
join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses shall be made
before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is
waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a
responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such
motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse
party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert at
the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting
the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and

not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary
judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given
reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by
Rule 56.
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but
within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the
pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and
all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard and
determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders that the
hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial.
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive
pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be
required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite
statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the
defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is granted and the
order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of the order or within
such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the pleading to which the
motion was directed or make such order as it deems just.
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading
or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a
party within twenty days after the service of the pleading, the court may order
stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial,
impertinent, or scandalous matter.
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule may
join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available. If a party
makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein all defenses and
objections then available which this rule permits to be raised by motion, the party
shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or objections so

omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this rule.
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not presented
either by motion or by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join an
indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim
may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for
judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that,
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The objection
or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in
the light of any evidence that may have been received.
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after the
denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a waiver of
such motion.
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an action
resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may file a
motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges which may
be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the court of
the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the plaintiff to file a
$300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for payment of such costs
and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. No security shall be
required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the United States.
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the undertaking
as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court shall, upon motion
of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action.

Rule 65C. Post-conviction relief.
(a) Scope. This rule shall govern proceedings in all petitions for post-conviction relief filed
under Utah Code Title 78B, Chapter 9, Post-Conviction Remedies Act.
(b) Commencement and venue. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition
with the clerk of the district court in the county in which the judgment of conviction was
entered. The petition should be filed on forms provided by the court. The court may order a
change of venue on its own motion if the petition is filed in the wrong county. The court may
order a change of venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the parties or witnesses.
(c) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims that the petitioner has in
relation to the legality of the conviction or sentence. Additional claims relating to the legality of
the conviction or sentence may not be raised in subsequent proceedings except for good
cause shown. The petition shall state:
(c)(1) whether the petitioner is incarcerated and, if so, the place of incarceration;
(c)(2) the name of the court in which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced and the
dates of proceedings in which the conviction was entered, together with the court's case
number for those proceedings, if known by the petitioner;
(c)(3) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of the petitioner's claim
to relief;
(c)(4) whether the judgment of conviction, the sentence, or the commitment for violation of
probation has been reviewed on appeal, and, if so, the number and title of the appellate
proceeding, the issues raised on appeal, and the results of the appeal;
(c)(5) whether the legality of the conviction or sentence has been adjudicated in any prior
post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and, if so, the case number and title of those
proceedings, the issues raised in the petition, and the results of the prior proceeding; and
(c)(6) if the petitioner claims entitlement to relief due to newly discovered evidence, the
reasons why the evidence could not have been discovered in time for the claim to be
addressed in the trial, the appeal, or any previous post-conviction petition.
(d) Attachments to the petition. If available to the petitioner, the petitioner shall attach to
the petition:
(d)(1) affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the allegations;
(d)(2) a copy of or a citation to any opinion issued by an appellate court regarding the direct
appeal of the petitioner's case;
(d)(3) a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior post-conviction or other civil
proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the conviction or sentence; and
(d)(4) a copy of all relevant orders and memoranda of the court.
(e) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or citations or
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discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in a separate memorandum, two
copies of which shall be filed with the petition.
(f) Assignment. On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly assign and deliver it to
the judge who sentenced the petitioner. If the judge who sentenced the petitioner is not
available, the clerk shall assign the case in the normal course.
(g)(1) Summary dismissal of claims. The assigned judge shall review the petition, and, if it
is apparent to the court that any claim has been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if any
claim in the petition appears frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue an order
dismissing the claim, stating either that the claim has been adjudicated or that the claim is
frivolous on its face. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim
shall terminate with the entry of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite
findings of fact or conclusions of law.
(g)(2) A petition is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations contained in
the pleadings and attachments, it appears that:
(g)(2)(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law;
(g)(2)(B) the claims have no arguable basis in fact; or
(g)(2)(C) the petition challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired prior to
the filing of the petition.
(g)(3) If a petition is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a pleading error or failure
to comply with the requirements of this rule, the court shall return a copy of the petition with
leave to amend within 20 days. The court may grant one additional 20 day period to amend for
good cause shown.
(g)(4) The court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial post-conviction petition in
a case where the petitioner is sentenced to death.
(h) Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that all or part of
the petition should not be summarily dismissed, the court shall designate the portions of the
petition that are not dismissed and direct the clerk to serve a copy of the petition, attachments
and memorandum by mail upon the respondent. If the petition is a challenge to a felony
conviction or sentence, the respondent is the state of Utah represented by the Attorney
General. In all other cases, the respondent is the governmental entity that prosecuted the
petitioner.
(i) Answer or other response. Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these rules for
service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition upon the respondent, or within such
other period of time as the court may allow, the respondent shall answer or otherwise respond
to the portions of the petition that have not been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other
response upon the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within 30 days (plus time allowed
for service by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, the
petitioner may respond by memorandum to the motion. No further pleadings or amendments
will be permitted unless ordered by the court.
(j) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set the proceeding for a
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hearing or otherwise dispose of the case. The court may also order a prehearing conference,
but the conference shall not be set so as to delay unreasonably the hearing on the merits of
the petition. At the prehearing conference, the court may:
(j)(1) consider the formation and simplification of issues;
(j)(2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents; and
(j)(3) require the parties to establish the admissibility of evidence expected to be presented
at the evidentiary hearing.
(k) Presence of the petitioner at hearings. The petitioner shall be present at the prehearing
conference if the petitioner is not represented by counsel. The prehearing conference may be
conducted by means of telephone or video conferencing. The petitioner shall be present
before the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need not otherwise be present in court
during the proceeding. The court may conduct any hearing at the correctional facility where the
petitioner is confined.
(I) Discovery; records. Discovery under Rules 26 through 37 shall be allowed by the court
upon motion of a party and a determination that there is good cause to believe that discovery
is necessary to provide a party with evidence that is likely to be admissible at an evidentiary
hearing. The court may order either the petitioner or the respondent to obtain any relevant
transcript or court records.
(m) Orders; stay.
(m)(1) If the court vacates the original conviction or sentence, it shall enter findings of fact
and conclusions of law and an appropriate order. If the petitioner is serving a sentence for a
felony conviction, the order shall be stayed for 5 days. Within the stay period, the respondent
shall give written notice to the court and the petitioner that the respondent will pursue a new
trial, pursue a new sentence, appeal the order, or take no action. Thereafter the stay of the
order is governed by these rules and by the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
(m)(2) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice that no action will be taken,
the stay shall expire and the court shall deliver forthwith to the custodian of the petitioner the
order to release the petitioner.
(m)(3) If the respondent gives notice that the petitioner will be retried or resentenced, the
trial court may enter any supplementary orders as to arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody,
bail, discharge, or other matters that may be necessary and proper.
(n) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under Rule 54(d),
to any party as it deems appropriate. If the petitioner is indigent, the court may direct the costs
to be paid by the governmental entity that prosecuted the petitioner. If the petitioner is in the
custody of the Department of Corrections, Utah Code Title 78A, Chapter 2, Part 3 governs the
manner and procedure by which the trial court shall determine the amount, if any, to charge for
fees and costs.
(o) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be appealed to and
reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah in accord with the statutes
governing appeals to those courts.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
HARRY MILLER,

RULING

Petitioner,

^Maeaar

Case No. 0809gg« J

v.

Judge Shell*

STATE OF UTAH,

entember 26.
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26, 200R
2008
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^

*"*

C

^^

Respondent.

This matter is before the Court on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. Having considered the
memoranda, the Court finds that the Motion should be GRANTED.
Petitioner seeks a determination that he was actually innocent of the charges against him, which were
ultimately dismissed. Actual innocence hearings are governed by Utah Code Annotated §78B-9-402 which
provides:
(2) (a) A person who has been convicted of a felony offense may petition the district court
in the county in which the person was convicted for a hearing to establish that the person is
factually innocent of the crime or crimes of which the person was convicted, if the person
asserts factual innocence under oath and the petition alleges:
(i) newly discovered material evidence exists that establishes that the petitioner is
factually innocent;
(ii) the petitioner identifies the specific evidence the petitioner claims establishes
innocence;
(iii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was known;
(iv) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence;
(v) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered evidence demonstrates
that the petitioner is factually innocent; and
(vi)

(A) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the
time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previously
filed post-trial motion or postconviction motion, and the evidence could not
have been discovered by the petitioner or the petitioner's counsel through the
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exercise of reasonable diligence;
(B) a court has found ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to exercise
reasonable diligence in uncovering the evidence; or
(C) the court waives the requirements of Subsection (2)(a)(vi)(A) or
(2)(a)(vi)(B) in the interest of justice.
In his Petition, Petitioner asserts that the following new evidence exists which establishes that he is factually
innocent. (1) the Affidavit of Beverly Kolder, a registered nurse who provided Petitioner home health care
in Louisiana on December 7, 2000 and December 14, 2000 and (2) the Affidavit of Berthella Miller. The
Court finds that Petitioner has not made the required showing for a hearing.
First, it is apparent from the record that Petitioner cannot meet either subsection (vi)(A) or (vi)(B).
Specifically, Petitioner was aware of the substance of this evidence at the time of trial and it was all
presented to his appellate counsel for purposes of making ineffective assistance of counsel claims on appeal.
Additionally, the Court found that trial counsel was not ineffective. Although the Court could waive either
or both of these requirements in the interest of justice, the Court finds that Petitioner has not met other
prongs of Section 78B-9-402.
Petitioner has not shown that the evidence, upon which he seeks to rely, is not cumulative of
evidence presented at trial. Petitioner presented his alibi defense at trial. These additional witness would
have served only to bolster his testimony, not to present a wholly new assertion.
Finally, Petitioner cannot show that this evidence would "establish" that he was innocent. Although
the evidence makes it unlikely that Petitioner committed the crime, the Court reviewed this evidence as part
of a remandfromthe court of appeals and determined that there was "no reasonable probability of a different
outcome at trial even if [the new witnesses] had testified."
For the foregoing reasons, the State's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. This Ruling and Order shall
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serve as thefinalorder on this matter. No further order need be prepared by the
DATED thisjg day of September, 2008.
Judge Sheila K. McC\
District Court Judge
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